Singapore Airlines Essay Example for Free

capital of Singapore flight paths EssayOver the past four decades, it has earned a stellar reputation in the ercely private-enterprise(a) commercial aviation business by providing customers with high-quality service and dominating the business-travel segments.Worlds Best Airline award from Cond NastTraveler 21 out of the 22 times it has beenawarded and Skytraxs Airline of the Yearaward three times over the past decade.Whats not so well known is that condescension thequality of its services, SIA is also one of the industrys most cost-effective operators. From 2001 to 2009, its cost per available piece of ass kilometer (ASK) were just 4.58 cents. According to a 2007 International Air Transport Associationstudy, costs for full-service European airlineswere 8 to 16 cents, for U.S. airlines 7 to 8 cents,and for Asian airlines 5 to 7 cents. In fact, SIAhad lower costs than most European andAmerican budget carriers, which ranged from4 to 8 cents and 5 to 6 cents respectively.Its interest that SIA has combined thesupposedly incompatible strategies of differ-harvard business review julyaugust 2010entiationwhich it pursues through serviceexcellence and continual innovationandcost leadership. Few enterprises have executed a dual strategy protably indeed, centering experts such as Michael Porter argue that its impossible to do so for a sustained period since dual strategies entail contradictory investments and organizational processes.Yet pursuing dual strategies is becoming an imperative. The direct for valuefor-money products and services has shot up since the recent recession, particularly in developed countries, so even producers of subvention offerings have to gure out how to grab opportunities in the middle and the low endof the market.Moreover, multinational corporations face controversy from rivals many of them from emerging marketsthatuse new technologies and business models toprovide good-enough offerings at attractiveprices. Incumbents can ght cover version by cuttingprices or further differentiating products andservices, but its often a losing battle.

Role of Federal Agencies Essay Example for Free

exercise of Federal Agencies EssayThe threat has reached the point that given enough time, motivation, and funding, a determined adversary leave behind likely be able to penetrate any system that is accessible directly from the Internet. It is difficult to estate with confidence that our lively infrastructurethe backbone of our countrys economic prosperity, national security, and public health provide remain unscathed and always be available when needed. The recent security breach by unauthorized intruders into the parent company of NASDAQ is an example of the kind of breaches directed against important financial infrastructure and illustrates the barrier of determining clear attribution. As we would in response to any such breach, the FBI is on the job(p) to identify the background knowledge of the intrusion and assist the victim in the remediation process.The FBI has identified the most significant cyber threats to our nation as those with high intent and high capabili ty to inflict damage or death in the U.S., to out of wedlock acquire assets, or to illegally obtain sensitive or classified U.S. military, recognition, or economic information. As both an intelligence and law enforcement agency, the FBI can address every facet of a cyber-casefrom collecting intelligence on the subjects in order to learn more(prenominal) about their networks to dismantling those networks and prosecuting the individual perpetrators. The ability to pass water action on the information we collect is comminuted beca manipulation what may begin as a deplorable investigation may become a national security threat. In addition, the FBIs presence in legal attachs in 61 cities around the world assists in the critical deputise of case-related information and the situational awareness of current threats, helping to combat the global scale and scope of cyber breaches.The FBI is also changing to adapt to the ever-evolving technology and schemes used by cyber criminals. Inte lligence now drives operations in the FBI. The Bureau is working in new ways with long-standing and new partners to address the cyber security threat. U.S. critical infrastructure faces a emergence cyber threat due to advancements in the availability and sophistication of malicious software tools and the fact that new technologies rhytidectomy new security issues that cannot always be addressed prior to adoption. The increasing automation of our critical infrastructures provides more cyber access points for adversaries to exploit. New smart grid and smart home products, designed to provide remote conference and control of devices in our homes, businesses, and critical infrastructures, must be developed and implemented in ways that will also provide protection from unauthorized use.Otherwise, each new device could become a ingress into our systems for adversaries to use for their own purposes. Industrial control systems, which operate the physical processes of the nations pipelin es, railroads, and separate critical infrastructures, are at elevated risk of cyber exploitation. The FBI is concerned about the proliferation of malicious techniques that could degrade, disrupt, or destroy critical infrastructure. Although likely only advanced threat actors are currently capable of employing these techniques, as we have seen with other malicious software tools, these capabilities will eventually be within reach of all threat actors. bright property rights violations, including theft of trade secrets, digital piracy, and trafficking manipulate goods, also represent high cybercriminal threats, resulting in losses of billions of dollars in profits annually. These threats also pose significant risk to U.S. public health and safety via counterfeit pharmaceuticals, electrical components, aircraft parts, and automobile parts. Cybercrime that manipulates the supply chain could pose a threat to national security interests and U.S. consumers. badly manufactured computer chips or chips that have been salvaged and repackaged infringe on intellectual property rights and could fail at critical times, posing a serious health and safety threat to U.S. citizens.Malware could be embedded on the chips to infiltrate information from computers and result in the theft of personally identifiable information (PII) that could then be used in future cybercrimes. As the quality of counterfeit goods increases, U.S. consumers may be challenged to tell the diversion amongst authentic and fraudulent goods. Operation lake herring Raider is a joint initiative between the U.S. and Canada that targets the illegal distribution of counterfeit network hardware manufactured by private entities in China. The use of counterfeit network components can lead to exploitation of cyber infrastructure vulnerabilities and even network failure. Since 2006, Operation Cisco Raider has seized over 3,500 network components amounting to $3.5 million of Cisco retail products. Ten individual s have been convicted as a result of the joint initiative. (Snow, 2012)ReferencesSnow G M 20120412 TestimonySnow, G. M. (2012, April 12). Testimony. Retrieved August 21, 2012, from http//www.fbi.gov Sternstein A 2012 Plan to Fighting nonionic Crime Recognizes Growing Cyber ThreatsSternstein, A. (2012). Plan to Fighting Organized Crime Recognizes Growing Cyber Threats. Retrieved August 22, 2012, from http//www.nextgov.com

Experiment in Proxemics Essay Example for Free

Experiment in Proxemics EssayProxemics as a terminology is a form of non-verbal communication. It deals with the structuring of the distance/space that exists amidst individuals while communicating with each other. Edward hall argued that the distance between people while communicating goes a long way to determine interpretation of messages and the meaning of messages existence sent. On the other hand, kinesics is a concept under proxemics that deals with the use of body movements and gestures in non-verbal communication.In this experiment, I made a essay of the difference between the use of kinesics and proxemics among different genders. In my first research, i choose a nearby basket ball court as a specimen. The radical comprises of cardinal males. I noticed that in this group, kinesics was typified. The players communicated more through body movements and although there were occasional physical connections closely of the communication was via gestures. In addition to t his, i choose the cheerleading group as a specimen of study representing the female group.Unlike what i noticed at the basketball court, there was more physical contact and more body movements. The use of space here was minimal as comp bed to what i noticed of the group that was predominantly male. Finally, i chose the choir in my church as my object of study because both genders are fully represented. Here, i noticed that there was more space and less use of body movements. unconnected from this, there were fewer physical contacts.From the result of my study, i conclude that there are gender differences in proxemics. This might be due to the physiological makeup of both genders. Apart from this, i believe there could be an explanation from the cultural perspective, in that the male funds is often seen as the reserved and tougher specie while the feminine specie is seen as more flexible and accommodating. Reference Mulvaney, B. (1994) Gender Differences in colloquy An Intercultur al Experience http//www. cpsr. org/cpsr/gender/mulvaney. txt

Explain the Principal Sociological Perspectives Essay Example for Free

Explain the Principal Sociological Perspectives EssayThe turnalist undertake in regard to wellness and aguish health came from Talcott Parsons. Talcott Parsons urged that people must be health for the auberge to function well. He continued to verify that illness is a form of unaccepted behaviour and people who argon ill converge the sick role. Moreover, his approach towards these members is that the articulate comes with responsibilities. The rights that ar related with the sick role intromit People expect to be excluded from normal roles for that period of time. or duties e. g. work, house chores and also to be nurtured. The family play an important role in caring for the sick person.Responsibility of the sick role is the sick person has to take good thrill of wellbeing in order to recover and return to normal duties. The functionalist bank line with the with government views regarding illness, that the society will be ineffective with sick people. Major strategies m ust be considered for the society to function. The Marxist approach Concerning health, illness and health and social care services that are offered, the Marxist adapt that this is an advantage to those in the high class. The government continue to al outset advertisement of products that cause ill health and junk food.Moreover, factories manufacture dangerous products and cars cause air pollution. The functionalist view ill health as something that top any time, whereas theorists say ill heath is a result of differences in the society. For example in areas of penury thither is high rate of unemployment. The government play a small role to eradicate issues that are associated with illness. in that respectfore people who are privileged benefit in the society. The Interactionist or social action approach The interactionist approach is centraliseed on the steps that an individual say about the illness, whether the illness existed or not.There are people who are seriously and do not consider themselves to be ill. There gouge be consequences to the sick person of being labelled ill. The interationists do not consider structures and institutions. However, they go steady on difficult relationships between people. Family, friends and professionals influence the individuals declaration of being ill. The interactionist was criticised of leaving the causes of illness and focus on relationships and negotiations that occur. The approach ignores medical reports and environmental factors like depression, poverty and pollution.Concept of health Health is the state when there is no unsoundness. Parson explained health which was proposed by the Who in 1974, as the condition of being physically, sharp and spiritually fit. The absence of disease received negative report that gives no attention to individuals physical, emotional and intellectual health. Car returnrs apply the holistic approach to care and support heath care users. Health care providers view themselves to deal with needs of patients instead of recognised matters.Three strands that were identified by Blaxter are positive when a person is fit and well negative health is being without agony or discomfort and functional health is the ability to carry out daily tasks. Models of health biomedical pretense The biomedical form originated from Western countries, the model supports the National Health Services. Health is considered as disease not found and professional help is required. The aim of professionals is to treat illness and the model so not focus on patients. Sociologists say look less on environmental factors that may cause ill health.The biomedical model focuses on the ill person instead of environmental and social factors. The biomedical model relates with the functionalist perspective. The functionalist perspectives say that illness cause the society be ineffective. The sick role has responsibilities to cooperate with the medical doctors. The socio-medical model The socio- medical model of health pays attention on environmental and social factors that lead to health in in the community. Researchers obtained information that life expectancy has increased and death rate is falling.The National Health Services provide free medical services. The report support that social factors cause ill health. The socio-medical model fits with the conflict theorists. appointment theorists identified that there is lower life expectancy and increasing rates of illness people with low income and areas of poverty. Less privileged people have a poor diet and they live in areas where there is pollution. Although politicians identify plans to help people with illness they do not want to contribute. Biomedical model look on diagnosis, whereas the socio-medical focus on environmental factors that cause illness.

Sucralose Essay Example for Free

Sucralose EssaySucralose (1,6-dichloro-1,6-dideoxy-b-D-fructo-furanosyl 4-chloro-4-deoxy-a-D-galactopyranoside), sold under the trade name Splenda (R), is normally categorized as non-nutritive lure or flavor enhancer. The molecular formula is C12H19Cl3O8 (1). It exists at room temperature as a white to off-white, crystalline powder, which is freely oil-soluble in water, in methanol, and in alcohol, and slightly soluble in ethyl acetate (1). Sucralose has molecular weight of 397. 64 (2). As a sweetener, it has 400 to 800 generation that of sucrose (2).Its melting point has been recorded as 130 degrees Celsius, and the boiling point is between 614. and 724. 4 degree Celsius under the condition of press 760 Torr (3). Sucralose is stable in solution at let loose pH, and also stable in solution at luxuriously temperatures as sucrose. Therefore, it can be stored for several(prenominal) years in liquids (3). The density of sucralose is about 1. 694 g/cm3 (3). The below chemical st ructure for sucralose was retrieved from the Dictionary of aliment Compounds (2) Sucralose was first synthesized by Hough and co-workers at the Queen Elizabeth College at the University of London during the 1970s and was developed commercially as an intense sweetener by Tate Lyle, LLC and McNeil Specialty Products Co (4).Sucralose is made by the selective substitution of one-third hydroxyl groups of sucrose with three chlorine atoms, which was first approved as a food bilinear in Canada in 1992 and has subsequently been approved in over 80 countries as an intense sweetener (4). Sucralose can be slowly hydrolyses to the two monosaccharides 1,6-dicholorofructose (1,6-DCF) and 4-chlorogalactose (4-CG) under severe acidic conditions, so the formula cannot be found in natural waters (4). Sucralose is usually used in baked goods, sugars, alcoholic drinks, dairy products, cereals, fruit, beverages and nut products (3).In general, sucralose may cause toxicity to aquatic organisms at con centrations ? 1123 mg/L (4). A range of long-term mammalian toxicity studies indicates that sucralose has no known specific mode of toxic fill and causes no adverse effects on major physiological systems (4). Recent research concerns that the potential biological effects in non-target species living in areas receive discharges from anthropogenic activities due to the widespread usage and the high stability of sucralose.The Predicted Environmental Concentration (PEC) for sucralose, based on measured data in surface water, was heady to be 10 ? g/L. During the process, data support that sucralose does not cause toxic effects. In conclusion, the resulting unprogressive PEC risk quotient is 0. 08, thus indicating low risk to aquatic organisms. Although available data suggest that sucralose is persistent in the aquatic environment, current knowledge also suggests that this intense sweetener should not be classified either as bioaccumulative or toxic using standardized and regulatory v alid PBT criteria (4).

Stackelberg Leader Follower Models For Strategic Decision Making Engineering Essay

Stackelberg Leader Follower Models For Strategic finality Making Engineering EssayThis paper re crop f all in all outs some Stackelberg Leader-Follower moldings used for strategic decision qualification. The simple Stackelberg duopoly is looked at off confine printing of solely, and a generalisation of the Stackelberg duopoly trouble is apt(p). By studying the feigns by tater et al. (1983) and Smeers and animal (1997), the paper revaluations Stackelberg simulate from its classical form to the recent random recitations. The paper looks at the numeral formulation of both(prenominal) a non additive numerical weapons platformming molding and a nonlinear stochastic programming regulate. Towards the end of this paper, a simple numeric example is r all(prenominal)n and applicative applications of Stackelberg Leader-Follower models ar discussed.Chapter 1 IntroductionIn economics, an oligopoly is considered to be the most interesting and complex marketplace structur e (amongst an other(prenominal) structures like monopolies and perfect competition). Most industries in the UK and world- from retailing to fast food, mobile phone networks to professional services- are oligopolistic. Given the current financial climate, it is tyrannical for houses to be sure that they gear up decisions accurately, maximising not only their shekels, but also their chances of remaining competitive. some mathematicians and economists reach attempted to model the decision making process and gelt maximizing strategies of oligopolistic planetary houses. For example, A. A. Cournot was one of the first mathematicians to model the de spuriousours of monopolies and duopolies in 1838. In Cournots model both loyals choose their sidetrack simultaneously assuming that the other secure does not alter its end product (Gibbons, 1992). Later, in 1934, H. V. Stackelberg proposed a different model where one of the duopoly sozzleds contacts its fruit decision first an d the other unanimous observes this decision and sets its output train (Stackelberg, 1934).The classical Stackelberg model has been prolonged to model a variety of strategic decision making. For example, stump spud et al. (1983) model the output decision making process in an oligopoly. Later works by Smeers and Wolf (1997) extend this model to include a stochastic element. More interestingly, in a model by He et al. (2009), the Stackelberg theory is used to model the interaction between a manufacturer and a retailer when making decisions just about cooperative advertize policies and wholesale bells.The accusive of this paper is to review the Stackelberg models from its classic form to the more recent stochastic versions. In chapter 2, the simple Stackelberg duopoly is reviewed and a generalisation of the Stackelberg duopoly enigma is given. In chapter 3, more complicated and recent models are reviewed. The mathematical formulation of white potato vine et al.s (1983) and S meers and Wolfs (1997) model is given. At the end of chapter 3, a numerical example is applied to Smeers and Wolfs (1997) model. In chapter 4, practical applications of Stackelberg leader- participator models are discussed. Chapter 4 also looks at the drawbacks of and possible extensions to Stackelberg models. Appendix 1 explains the Oligopoly market structure and economics involved in service maximisation.Chapter 2 Classical Stackelberg Leader-Follower Model2.1 Duopoly BehaviourStackelberg (1934) discussed outlay fundamental law under oligopoly by looking at the special carapace of a duopoly. He argued that smasheds in a duopoly evict behave either as dependent on or independent of the rival inviol equals behaviorReferring to the two firms as firm 1 and firm 2, respectively, firm 1s behaviour ass be speak as followsFirm 1 views the behaviour of firm 2 as being independent of firm 1s behaviour. Firm 1 would regard firm 2s planning as a given variable and adapts itself to this supply. Thus, the behaviour of firm 1 is dependent on that of firm 2 (Stackelberg, 1934).Firm 1 can view the behaviour of firm 2 as being dependent on firm 1s behaviour. Thus, firm 2 always adapts itself to the formers behaviour (firm 2 views firm 1s behaviour as a given situation) (Stackelberg, 1934).However, according to Stackelberg (1934), thither is a difference in the firms actual positions severally of the firms could adapt to either of these two positions, making scathe constitution imperfect. Stackelberg (1934) describes three cases that arise from this situationBowler (1924) first described a situation when both firms in the duopoly strive for market dominance. accord to Bowler (1924), for this to happen the first firm supplies the quantity it would if it reign the market with the second firm as a follower. This supply is referred to as the independent supply. By preparation this output level the first firm tries to convince the second firm to view its behaviour a s a given variable. However, the second firm also supplies the independent supply since it is also striving for market dominance. This duopoly is referred to as the Bowler duopoly with positive supply of the duopoly equalling the sum of two independent supply. According to Stackelberg (1934), the set administration under the Bowler duopoly is unstable because neither of the firms tries to maximise boodle under the given circumstance.The second case described by Stackelberg (1934) is a situation where both firms favour being dependent on the other firms behaviour. The first firm would have to match (in a realize maximising manner) its output level to the each output in the second firms feasible set of output. The second firm does the comparable and both firms are thus followers. This is a Cournot duopoly, first described by A. A Cournot in 1838. According to Stackelberg 1934, the price formation here is unstable because neither of the firms tries to achieve the largest profit u nder the given circumstance.The third case is a situation where one firm strives for independence and the other favour being dependent. In this case both firms are better off doing what the other firm would like. Both firms adapt their behaviour to maximising profit under the given circumstance. This situation is referred to as the asymmetric duopoly or more commonly as the Stackelberg duopoly. The price formation is more stable in this case because, according to Stackelberg (1934), no one has an interest in modifying the actual price formation.The Stackelberg model is based on the third case of a Stackelberg duopoly.2.2 The ModelIn the Stackelberg duopoly the leader (Stackelberg firm) moves first and the follower moves second. As opposed to other models like the Bertrand model and Cournot model where firms make decisions about price or output simultaneously, firms in the Stackelberg duopoly make decisions sequentially.The Stackelberg sense of balance is boundd using backward in ductive reasoning (first determine the follower firms best response to an arbitrary output level by the Stackelberg firm). According to Gibbons (1992), information is an important element of the model. The information in question is the Stackelberg firms level of output (or price, Dastidar (2004) looks at Stackelberg equilibrium in price). The follower firm would know this output once the Stackelberg firm moves first and, as importantly, the Stackelberg firm knows that the follower firm entrust know the output level and respond to it accordingly.Inspired by the work of Gibbons (1992), Murphy et al. (1983) and Dastidar (2004), a general firmness of purpose to the Stackelberg game (duopoly) is derived in the parts that follow.2.2.1 Price suffice, follow mathematical crops, and profit accountabilitysSuppose that two firms in a duopoly supply a homogeneous product.Denote the gather up function of this market as, where is the total level of output supplied by the duopoly (is the Stackelberg firms output level and is the follower firms output level). The price function can be re-written as.Denote the cost functions (Appendix 1) as for the Stackelberg firm, and for the follower firm.The profit function of the Stackelberg firm is given bySimilarly, the profit function of the follower firm is given by2.2.2 Backward induction to derive the best response functions and Stackelberg equilibriumAccording to Gibbons (1992), the best response for the follower exit be one that maximises its profit given the output decision of the Stackelberg firm.The followers profit maximisation conundrum can be written asThis can be cleard by differentiating the design function and liken the derived function to zero point (as seen in Appendix 1). use chain rule to differentiate equation 2 and vista the differential to zero, the hobby result is obtained poster that this is a partial differentiation of the profit function since the function depends on the pauperization func tion which depends on two variables. Equation 4 gives the followers best response function. For a given the best response quantity satisfies equation 4. As a result, the Stackelberg firms profit maximisation enigma becomesBy differentiating the quarry function in equation 5 and equating the differential to zero, the pursual result which maximises the Stackelberg firms profit is obtainedBy solving equation 6 with the follower firms best response profit maximising output, is obtained by the Stackelberg firm given the followers best response. Gibbons (1992) describes as the Stackelberg equilibrium (or the Nash equilibrium of the Stackelberg game).2.2.3 ExampleGibbons (1992) considers a simple duopoly merc dedicateising homogeneous products. He assumes that both firms are akin and the bare(a) cost of production is constant at. He also assumes that the market faces a linear downward sloping demand thin. The profit function of the firms is given bywhere, with representing the Stacke lberg firm and representing the follower firm.Using backward induction, the follower firms best response function is deliberateSolving equation 8The Stackelberg firm anticipates that its output will be met by the followers response. Thus the Stackelberg firm maximises profit by setting output toSolving equation 10Substituting this in equation 9Equations 11 and 12 give the Stackelberg equilibrium. The total output in this Stackelberg duopoly is.Note Gibbons (1992) worked out the total output in a Cournot duopoly to be (using this example) which is less than the output in the Stackelberg duopoly the market price is higher in the Cournot duopoly and lower in the Stackelberg duopoly. to each one firm in the Cournot duopoly produces the follower is worse off in the Stackelberg model than in the Cournot model because it would supply a lower quantity at a lower market price. Clear, there exists a first mover advantage in this case.In general, according to Dastidar (2004), first advantage is possible if firms are identical and if the demand is concave and be are convex. Gal-or (1985) showed that first mover advantage exists if the firms are identical and have identical downward sloping best response functions.Chapter 3 Recent Stackelberg Leader-Follower ModelsThe classical Stackelberg model has been an uptake for m each economists and mathematicians. Murphy et al. (1983) extend the Stackelberg model to an oligopoly. Later, Smeers and Wolf (1997) extended Murphy et al.s model to a stochastic version where demand is unknown when the Stackelberg firm makes its decision. In a more recent brood by DeMiguel and Xu (2009) the Stackelberg business is extended to an oligopoly with multi-leaders.In this section the models proposed by Murphy et al. (1983) and Smeers and Wolf (1997) are reviewed.3.1 A nonlinear Mathematical course of instructionming random variableThe model proposed by Murphy et al (1983), is a nonlinear mathematical programming version of the Stackelberg model. In their model, they consider the supply side of an oligopoly that supplies homogeneous product. The model is designed to model output decisions in a non-cooperative oligopoly.There are followers in this market who are referred to as Cournot firms (note that from now onwards the follower firms are referred to as Cournot firm as opposed to just follower firms) and leader who is referred to as the Stackelberg firm (as in advance). The Stackelberg firm considers the reaction of the Cournot firms in its output decision and sets its output level in a profit maximising manner. The Cournot firms, on the other hand, observe the Stackelberg firms decision and maximise their case-by-case profits by setting output under the Cournot assumption of zero probable variations (Carlton and Perloff, 2005, touch on conjectural variation are expectations made by firms in an oligopolistic market about reactions of the other firm). It is assumed that all the firms have comp allowe knowledge ab out the other firms.3.1.1 Notations and assumptionsFor each Cournot firm, allow represent the output level. For the Stackelberg firm, let represent the output level (note that is used here instead of, as seen earlier, to distinguish the Stackelberg firm from the Cournot firms).is the total cost function of level of output by Cournot firms and is the total cost function of level of output by the Stackelberg firm.let represents the inverse market demand curve (that is, is the price at which consumers are unforced and able to purchase units of output).In supplyition to the Cournot assumption and assumption of complete knowledge, Murphy et al. (1983) make the following assumptionand are both convex and doubly differentiable.is a rigorously decreasing function and twice differentiable which satisfies the following inequality,There exists a quantity (the maximum level of output any firm is willing to supply) such(prenominal)(prenominal) that,For referencing, these set of assumption wi ll be referred to as assertion A.Assumption 2 implies that the industrys marginal revenue (Appendix 1) decreases as industry supply increases. A trial impression of this severalisement can be found in the report by Murphy et al. (1983).Assumption 3 implies that at output levels the marginal cost is greater than the price.3.1.2 Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SCN) equilibriumThe Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SCN) equilibrium is derived at in a similar way to the Stackelberg equilibrium seen in chapter 2.Using backward induction, Murphy et al. (1983) first maximise the Cournot firms profit under the assumption of zero conjectural variation and for a given.For each Cournot firm let the set of output levels be such that, for a given and assuming are fixed, solves the following Cournot problemAccording to Murphy et al. (1983), the objective function in equation 15 is a strictly convex profit function over the closed, convex and squelch legal separation. This implies that a unique optimum exis ts.The functions can be referred to as the joint reaction functions of the Cournot firms. Murphy et al. (1983) define the aggregate reaction curve asThe Stackelberg problem can be written asIf solves, so the set of output levels is the SNC equilibrium withTo get this equilibrium, the output levels need to be determined. Murphy et al. (1983) use the Equilibrating program (a family of mathematical programs designed to reconcile the supply-side and demand-side of a market to equilibrium) to determineLet the Lagrange multiplier associated with the maximisation problem 19 be. Murphy et al.s (1983) approach here is to determine for which the optimum. The following result, obtained from Murphy et al. (1983), defines the optimal solution to problem 19Theorem 1 For a fixed, consider Problem mull over that satisfy Assumption A. Denote by the unique optimal solution to and let be the corresponding optimal Lagrange Multiplier associated with problem 19. (In case since alternative optimal mu ltipliers associated with problem 19 exist, let be the minimum non-negative optimal Lagrange Multiplier.) Then,is a continuous function of for.is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of. Moreover, there exist output levels and such that and .A set of output levels optimal to Problem, where, satisfy the Cournot Problem 15 if and only if, whence, for.(This theorem is taken from Murphy et al. (1983) with a few alterations to the notation)The proof of this result can be found in the report by Murphy et al. (1983).This theorem provides an efficient way of finding for each fixed. For example, one can simple conduct a univariate bisection search to find the unique root of.3.1.3 Properties of andMurphy et al. (1983) describes the aggregate Cournot reaction curve as followsis a continuous, strictly decreasing function of.If the right hand derivative of with respect to is denoted as (the rate of increase of with an increase in ), then for each The proof to these two properties can be fo und in the report by Murphy et al. (1983).Murphy et al. (1983) arouse that if solves the Stackelberg problem 17, then the profit made by the Stackelberg firm is greater than or equal to the profit it would have made as a Cournot firm. Suppose that is a Nash-Cournot equilibrium for the firm oligopoly. is the output the Stackelberg firm would supply if it was a Cournot firm. solvesBut since solves the Stackelberg problem 17, the following must holdIn fact, is the lower set of. The proof to this can be found in Murphy et al. (1983)From assumption 3 in Assumption A, it is clear that. Thus, it is clear that is an amphetamine bound. However, according to Murphy et al. (1983) another upper bound exists. In a paper by Sherali et al. (1980) on the Interaction between Oligopolistic firms and Competitive Fringe (a price taking firm in an oligopoly that competes with dominant firms) a different follower-follower model is discussed. In this model, the competitive fringe is content at equilibri um to have adjusted its output to the level for which marginal cost equals price. Murphy et al. (1983) summarise this model as followsFor fixed and suppose is a set of output levels such that for each firm solvesandFor the Stackelberg firm, let satisfyIn addition to Assumption A, if is strictly convex, then a unique solution exists and satisfies conditions 23 and 24. The Equilibrating Program with a fringe becomesTheorem 1 holds for with and which implies that. In fact, if is strictly convex, is the upper bound of.Collectively, is bounded as follows3.1.4 universe and uniqueness of the Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot equilibriumMurphy et al. (1983) prove the existence and uniqueness of the Stackelberg-Nash-Cournot (SCN) equilibrium. Their approach to the proof is summarised below conceptionFor the SNC equilibrium to exist, and for should satisfy Assumption A.Since is bounded and is continuous (as is continuous), the Stackelberg problem 17 involves the maximisation of a continuous objective function over the compact set. This implies that an optimal solution exists. From Theorem 1 it is seen that a unique set of output levels, which simultaneously solves the Cournot problem 15, exists. As a result the SNC equilibrium exists.UniquenessIf is convex, then the equilibrium is unique.Since is convex, the objective function of the Stackelberg problem 17 becomes strictly concave on. This has been proven by Murphy et al. (1983) and the proof can be found in their report. This implies the equilibrium is unique.3.1.5 Algorithm to solve the Stackelberg problemMurphy et al. (1983) provide an algorithm in their report to solve the Stackelberg problem. This algorithm is summarised as followsTo start with the Stackelberg firm needs the following information about the market and the Cournot firmsCost functions of the Cournot firms, satisfying Assumption A.The upper bound as per Assumption A.The inverse demand function for the industry, which also satisfies Assumption A.With this infor mation, the Stackelberg firm need to determine the lower bound and split the interval into control grid points with, where and (from 26). A piecewise linear approximation of is made as followsHere,is an approximation to and from equation 20 it follows thatNote that at each grid point the approximation agrees with.The Stackelberg problem 17, thus, becomescan be re-written asWhere andThus problem 30 becomesThe objective function is strictly concave and solvable.Let be the objective function of the Stackelberg problem 17 and the objective function of the piecewise Stackelberg problem 32, thenSuppose is the optimum level of output. First, suppose that is an endpoint of the interval, then. Now suppose that, that is, . Then needs to be judged in order to determine. Theorem 1 can be used here. find that is a continuous, decreasing function of. To find the point where (part iii of Theorem 1), the following method is suggested by Murphy et al. (1983)Figure Method for determiningSource Sm eers and Wolf (1997) (alterations made to the notation)First determine using the bounds. Next, determine using the bounds. Then determine using the bounds.Next, determine using the bounds and so on. If then evaluate using the bounds.Having evaluated for some grid points, the game can either be terminated with the best of these grid points as an optimal solution or the grid can be re be at an appropriate contribution to improve accuracy.Murphy et al. (1983) go on to determine the maximum error from the estimated optimal Stackelberg solution. This is summarised belowLet be the derivative of with respect to , thenLet be the marginal profit made by the Stackelberg firm for supplying units of output,Let be the actual optimal objective function value in the interval with the estimate being . Then the error of this estimate is defined assatisfies the followingThis concludes the review of Murphy et al.s (1983) nonlinear mathematical programing model of the Stackelberg problem in an oligopo ly.3.2 A Stochastic VersionSmeers and Wolf (1997) provide an extension to the nonlinear mathematical programming version of the Stackelberg model by Murphy et al. (1983) discussed in branch 3.1. In the same way as Murphy et al.s (1983) model, the Stackelberg game in this version is played in two stages. In the first stage, the Stackelberg firm makes a decision about its output level. In the second stage, the Cournot firms, having observed the Stackelberg firms decision, react according to the Cournot assumption of zero conjectural variation. However, Smeers and Wolf (1997) add the element of uncertainty to this process. When the Stackelberg firm makes its decision the market demand is uncertain, but demand is known when the Cournot firms make their decision. This makes the Smeers and Wolfs (1997) version of the Stackelberg model stochastic. Smeers and Wolf (1997) assume that this uncertainty can be modelled my demand scenarios.3.2.1 Notations and AssumptionFor the costs functions, the same notations are used. is the total cost function of level of output by Cournot firms and is the total cost function of level of output by the Stackelberg firm.The demand function is changed slightly to take into account the uncertainty. is a set of demand scenarios with corresponding probabilities of occurrence As such, is the price at which customers are willing and able to purchase units of output in demand scenario . has a luck of occurrence.The same Assumption set A discussed in subsection 3.1.1 apply here with alterations made to conditions 13 and 14. Assumption set A can be re-written asand are both convex and twice differentiable, as before.is a strictly decreasing function and twice differentiable which satisfies the following inequality,There exists a quantity (the maximum level of output any firm is willing to supply in each demand scenario) such that,For referencing, these set of assumption will be referred to as Assumption B.3.2.2 Stochastic Stackelberg-Nash-Courn ot (SSNC) equilibriumSmeers and Wolf (1997) use the same approach seen before to derive the SSNC equilibrium.The Cournot problem 15can be re-written as followsFor each Cournot firm and each demand scenario, let the set of output levels be such that, for a given and assuming are fixed, solves the following Cournot problemNote that is the output level of Cournot firm when the demand scenario is .For each, according to Murphy et al. (1983), the objective function in equation 40 is a strictly convex profit function over the closed, convex and compact interval.The functions can be referred to as the joint reaction functions of the Cournot firms for a demand scenario. The aggregate reaction curve becomesThe Stackelberg problem with demand uncertainty can be written asNote the Stackelberg problem defined problem 42 differs from that defined in 17. This is because of the element of uncertainty. The Cournot problem 40 is similar to the Cournot problem 15 because the demand is known when the Cournot firms make their decision. In the Stackelberg problem 42 note the element. This is the estimated mean price, that is, the Stackelberg firm considers the reaction of the Cournot firm under each demand scenario and works out the market price in each scenario, and it then multiplies it by the probability of each scenario. The summation of this represents the estimated mean price.If solves the stochastic, then the set of output levels is the SSNC equilibrium for demand scenario.To get this equilibrium, the output levels need to be determined. Smeers and Wolf (1997) use the same approach as Murphy et al. (1983) in doing so. The Equilibrating program is the same as that in 19, with changes made to the Cournot output and demand function For each demand scenario ,Theorem 1 lays out a universe on how to solve the Equilibrating program in problem 19 and can also be used to solve 44. Smeers and Wolf (1997) Summarise Theorem 1 as followsTheorem 2 For each fixed,An optimal solution for the problem satisfies the Cournot problem 40 if and only if the Lagrange multiplier,, associated with the Equilibrating program 44, is equal to zero.This multiplier is a continuous, strictly decreasing function of . Moreover, there exists and such that(This theorem is taken from Smeers and Wolf (1997), with a few alteration to the notations)The properties of are the same as those discussed in subsection 3.1.3. The existence and uniqueness of the SSNC equilibrium is shown in the same ways as the SNC equilibrium of Murphy et al.s (1983) model discussed in subsection 3.1.4.3.2.3 Algorithm to solve the Stackelberg problemThe Stackelberg problem here is solved in the same way Murphy et al. (1983) proposed (discussed in subsection 3.1.5).In their report, Smeers and Wolf (1997) do not specify the upper and lower bound of, thus, it is assumed that is bounded by.The interval can be split into grid points with, where and . The piecewise linear approximation of in 27 can be re-written as follo wsHere,has the same properties as 29.The Stackelberg problem 42, thus, becomesHereafter, the algorithm summarised in subsection 3.1.5 can be used to solve this problem.3.3 Numerical ExampleIn Murphy et al.s (1983) report a simple example of the Stackelberg model is given. They consider the case of a linear demand curve and quadratic cost functionsIt is assumed that the Stackelberg firm and Cournot firms are identical. The Cournot problem 15 becomes as follow, with as the optimal solutionSolving this problem yieldsNote the upper bound of is found by setting. The working to get equation 51 is shown in Appendix 2.The aggregate reaction curve can be written asUsing this information, this example is now extended to Smeers and Wolfs (1997) model with numerical values.Note that the functions listed in equations 49, 50, 51 and 52 satisfy Assumptions A B and other properties discussed in previous sections.Suppose and. And suppose demand is unknown when the Stackelberg firm makes its decisio n. The cost functions of the firms will be as followsFigure Different Demand ScenariosThe tables below describe the possible demand scenarios, probability of each scenario occurring, the joint reaction curve and aggregate reaction curve for, andScenario,Demand,Probability,= Demand falls,= Demand stiff unchanged,= Demand Increases,Scenario,Joint reaction curve,Aggregate reaction curve,Using this information, the Stackelberg problem 42 can be solved. First, the estimated price element can be calculated as followsSubstituting this result back into the Stackelberg problem 42 givesThis problem can easily be solved by differentiating the objective function and finding the value of for which the differential is equal to zero. The working to obtain the following optimal solution is shown in Appendix 2.Using this result, the following result is obtained for each demand scenarioFigure Optimal Output, Price and Profit1260.87098.02652.96147.042260.870134.39798.42201.583260.870170.75943.87256 .13Stackelberg firm Profit,Cournot firm Profit,Industry Profit,121,243.8712,010.8169,387.12235,573.1222,574.95125,872.92349,802.3736,444.87195,581.87The tables in figure 3 state the SSNC equilibriums for each scenario, and the profits made by each firm in this oligopoly and the total industry profit in each scenario. Note that since is strictly convex, the equilibrium obtained for each scenario is unique. Also note that in all three scenarios, the Stackelberg Output and profit is greater than that of the Cournot firms, illustrating the first mover advantage.Chapter 4 DiscussionIn this section, the practical applications, drawbacks and possible extensions to Stackelberg models are discussed.4.1 Practical Applications of Stackelberg modelsStackelberg models are widely used by firms to aid decision making. virtually examples includeManufacturer-Retailer Supply ChainHe et al. (2009) present a stochastic Stackelberg problem to model the interaction between a manufacturer and a retailer. The manufacturer would announce its cooperative ad policy (percentage of retailers advertising expenses it will cover-participation rate) and the wholesale price. The retailer, in response, chooses its optimal advertising and pricing policies. When the retailers advertising and pricing is an importan

Impact of Human Resources Management

Impact of Human Resources focusRobert ProctorIntroductionThe intent of this newsprint is to answer questions nigh the Human Resource handlers impact during organizational deepens or argufys and dickens questions about my welcome with change and challenge with the support of the Human Resource Management of my organization the Navy Personnel oppose Detachment (PSD).What are the competencies of a Human Resource Manager?One writer defines Human Resources competencies skills sets as intrinsic characteristics which exhibit themselves through ones personal traits, habits, motives, social roles, and self-image. All these attributes enable a person to part with excellence in performance in any given job, role, or situation (Darvish, Moogali, Moosavi, Panahi, 2012). Snell and Bohlander categorizes these competencies into mastery sets called military control mastery, human mastery and personal credibility (Snell Bohlander, 2012).In my opinion, I see the position of the Human Re sources Manager as being that of a middleman in any organization who is tasked with providing the human touch inside the organization. As the writer states above, they are the branch of any organization that must operate at the highest direct of proficiency in all areas. The Human Resources Management department of my organization (Department of the Air Force) in my run across is a group of people who one keep rely on to have answers to a assorted array of issues personally and professionally. I have heard from others of their experiences with HR departments, in their organization, which resulted in less than the meter manner of excellence that one would expect.How a change/challenged was introduced in my organization?The scope of operations for the building block I am assigned to which is the San Antonio Navy Personnel Detachment is to provide administrative and financial operate for staff and student military personnel stationed at Joint-Base San Antonio (Fort Sam, Lackland AFB, and Randolph AFB) and the surrounding reserve unit and recruiting commands that are in and around San Antonio and as far north as Austin, Texas.The Department of the Navy Human Resources branch tardily conducted a work survey of various personnel support detachment. My unit was involved in that survey. Because of that survey, there was a worldwide operational reconfiguration excogitation implemented for the realignment of all Navy Personnel Support Detachments. The purpose of this reconfiguration was to consolidate the detachments out-of-pocket to an implementation of an e-resource which took away many of their tasks when it allowed sailor level self-service for many of their administrative and personnel services.This resulted in a need for reduction and an overhaul the current support detachments configuration. This reduction in support detachments was accomplished through consolidation by realignment of support detachments. Because of that change, our unit became the com mand center for two outlining units (Houston and Corpus Christi). What this meant to us is the demographics of our customer base not only increased in sizes but the complexities of administrative action we would conduct changed as well. Typically, our standard client is enlisted initial entry and retiring Navy personnel.What is the separate HR Manager response to for this change/challenge?The HR Department has approached this change from a proactive perspective. We were provided numerous briefings at least 12 months prior to the changed in the configuration that unbroken everyone informed of the matter and provided enough space to answer any concerns as the project moved forward. Once the change began and during the hand-off phase, we were kept in the loop at the leave where the change would affect us the most. Due to the proximity of the units, we hereditary the leadership team at the local level began to operate in a flexible port that is partly reactive and partly proactive. This flexibility allows the leadership team the opportunity to identify any faults in their operating process to help them better integrate with the command. If they have not accomplished this step yet, I believe Navy HR Department and the local Leadership staff should have an action plan in place that outlines appropriate training requirements that ensure everyone is operating from the same standards.Was the involvement of the Human Resources Management beneficial with this change?Overall, the change has progressed fairly smoothly. Though there have been a few miscues along the way, I see the process going forth as efficiently and professionally as it can be done. The leadership has visited the outlining units frequently. And as we receive work from these units, many of the clerks at the command level are noticing a decrease in errors and issues. I believe much of the success in this transition is due in part to the oversight of the Department of the Navy HR department who continu e to facilitate the change to ensure the changeover results in a seamless and disruption-free transition.ConclusionThe purpose of this paper was to answer questions about the Human Resource Managers impact during organizational changes or challenges and two questions about my experience with change and challenge with the support of the Human Resource Management of my organization the Navy Personnel Support Detachment (PSD).ReferencesDarvish, H., Moogali, A., Moosavi , M., Panahi, B. (2012, family 30). Survey relationship between human resources roles and human resources competencies. International Journal of Academic Research in Business and Social Sciences, 2(9), 8. Retrieved from http//www.lexisnexis.com.uiwtx.idm.oclc.org/hottopics/lnacademic/?verb=srcsi=400870sr=HEADLINE(Survey+Relationship+between+Human+Resources+Roles+and+Human+Resources+Competencies)%2BAND%2BDATE%2BIS%2B2012Snell, S. A., Bohlander, G. W. (2012). Managing human resources (29th ed.). VitalSource Books. Retri eved from https//www.vitalsource.com/